Policy-Based Governance within Luna: Why We Developed Yet Another Agent Framework

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Abstract— In this article, we explain our rationale for the development of Luna, a software agent framework. In particular, we focus on how we use capabilities for comprehensive policy-based governance to ensure that key requirements for security, declarative specification of taskwork, and built-in support for joint activity within mixed teams of humans and agents are satisfied. KAoS, IHMC’s ontology-based policy services framework, enables the semantically-rich and extensible semantics and the operational power and flexibility needed to realize these capabilities within Luna. We show how Luna is specifically designed to allow developers and users to leverage different forms of policy-based governance in an endless variety of ways.

Keywords: software agents, multi-agent systems, policy, Luna, KAoS, OWL, ontologies, cyber security

I. INTRODUCTION

IHMC’s innovations in research and development of software agent frameworks for multi-agent systems stretch back more than fifteen years (see, e.g., [1, 2, 3]). As a happy consequence of progress in the field since those early days, there now exists a range of interesting agent frameworks, serving different purposes, available from a variety of commercial sources and research institutions, that can be applied with confidence to many practical applications. For this reason, we had not expected that we would ever have to create a new agent system. However, contrary to expectation, we have recently applied our experience to develop a new agent framework called Luna. In this paper, we attempt to explain why.

The short answer is that when we were confronted with the need to apply software agent technology within the domain of cybersecurity operations, we found that no current platform adequately met our needs. Foremost among our requirements were the following: 1) the need for a platform that would meet the stringent requirements of security needed for cyber operations; 2) the need for a platform that would support the interactive definition of common agent tasks through declarative means rather than software coding, and 3) the need for a platform that would provide built-in support for effective coordination of joint activity within mixed teams of humans and agents. Let us briefly consider each of these three requirements one by one.

In considering the security requirements of currently available software agent platforms, the key role of policy constraints that could govern behavior at every level of the agent system readily became apparent. In our previous experiences with agent systems, we had discovered that people sometimes were reluctant to deploy agents exhibiting significant autonomy because of concerns that the freedom and indeterminacy of such agents might allow them to do undesirable things [4]. We have found that the ability to use policy to impose constraints on agent behavior, in essence providing a guarantee to people that agent autonomy would always be exercised within specified bounds, gave people the assurance they needed to feel that highly capable agents could act in a trustworthy, predictable, and safe manner. We considered that in order to maintain user confidence it was important that policy be capable of governing not only high-level agent actions that could be enforced by the agent platform itself, but also agent behavior that required access to the lowest levels of operating system and network behavior. In this way, we hoped to assure that buggy or malicious agents could be prevented from executing actions that might impair the integrity of other agents or applications and from engaging in backchannel network communication without the knowledge and consent of those people to whom the agents ought to be accountable.

Second, with respect to the need for a platform supporting the interactive formulation of common agent tasks by end users, rather than by software developers, we believe that policy systems may also prove useful. In past experience with military, space, and intelligence applications, we have learned that many common tasks can be formulated as declarative obligation policies that require given actions to occur when triggered by a specified context. Further enhancing the usefulness of such capabilities to define agent taskwork is the potential for specifying abstract obligations on an initially-unspecified population of agents in a fashion that is similar to how concrete obligations are imposed on specific classes and instances of agents. Abstract actions take one of two forms: 1) goals to be satisfied through the operation of top-down planning and execution mechanisms, or 2) collective obligations to be satisfied through bottom-up emergent forms of agent coordination. To enable practical use of obligation policies for the specification of agent tasks, capabilities for automated two-way mapping of terms in policy ontologies to agent-method-calls are needed.

Third, to satisfy the need for a platform that would provide built-in support for effective coordination of joint activity within mixed teams of humans and agents, we believe that a policy-based approach also provides a viable option. Based on our research and development experience in a variety of applications involving the coordination of
human-agent-robot teamwork (HART), we believe that important aspects of teamwork such as observability, directability, interpretability, learning, and multiplicity can be addressed by policy-based mechanisms [5, 6].

In this article, we will give a brief overview of the Luna agent framework and describe how we are using its capabilities in cyber security applications. Luna is named for the founder of Pensacola, Tristán de Luna y Arellano (1519 – 1571). We will focus primarily on policy-based features that support the three requirements outlined above. Section 2 will give an overview of the KAoS policy services framework. Section 3 will briefly describe our objectives in the design of Luna agent framework, and selected highlights of its features. Section 4 will illustrate by example some of the ways in which policy governance is being exploited within Luna. Finally, section five will outline current areas of research and future directions.

II. THE KAoS POLICY SERVICES FRAMEWORK

Because agents are powerful, we use powerful policy management and enforcement frameworks to govern their actions. Whereas many special-purpose policy approaches are optimized only for specific kinds of tasks (e.g., access control) and support only the ability to permit or forbid an action, the ontology-based approach of KAoS enables semantically-rich specifications of virtually any kind of policy. It supports not only the ability to permit or forbid an action in a given context, but also to require that certain actions be performed when a dynamic, context-specific trigger is activated (e.g., start doing X, stop doing Y, reduce your bandwidth usage, log certain actions)—or to waive such an obligation dynamically if the situation warrants.

The KAoS Policy Services framework [7] was the first to offer an ontology-based approach (based on the W3C standard, OWL 2 [8]) to policy representation and reasoning. It is currently the most successful and mature of all such efforts. In a review of alternative policy language approaches presented by the NSA-sponsored Digital Policy Management (DPM) Architecture Group, KAoS was highlighted as the “recommended policy ontology starting point” [9]. Following subsequent collaborative efforts by DPM and IHMC, the KAoS core ontology was adopted as the basis for future standards efforts in DPM [10].

KAoS has already been integrated into IHMC’s Luna agent framework, as well as several other agent platforms and traditional service-oriented architectures. Preliminary work has been done on agent learning mechanisms that propagate learning with localized opportunistic mechanisms inspired by biological analogues. In addition, we plan to develop capabilities for KAoS to take advantage of localized agent learning results by allowing new policies to be constructed programmatically, with optional human oversight. This would allow learning results from groups of individual agents that are of high generality or urgency to be rapidly propagated to whole classes of other agents.

Two important requirements for the KAoS architecture are modularity and extensibility. These requirements are supported through a framework with well-defined interfaces that can be extended, if necessary, with the components required to support application-specific policies. The basic elements of the KAoS architecture are shown in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: KAoS Policy Services Conceptual Architecture.](image)

Maintaining consistency among the three layers is handled automatically by KAoS, a task made more challenging because each layer implements its functionality in a distributed, rather than a centralized, manner.

Within each of the layers, the end user may plug-in specialized extension components if needed, as described in more detail throughout the paper. Such components are typically developed as Java classes and described using ontology concepts in the configuration file. They can then be used by KAoS in policy specification, reasoning and enforcement processes.

Automatic assistance in the arbitration of policy conflicts has become increasingly important as the tempo and scale of policy-governed systems increases. KAoS contains capabilities for dealing with a variety of static policy conflicts that can be resolved at design time (e.g., resolving conflicts when one policy obligates an actor to do something and another forbids it to do so), and work is underway to address conflicts in dynamic resource availability that need to be resolved at run time (e.g., meeting Quality of Service constraints fairly under conditions of inadequate of fluctuating resources). The concept of “collective obligations” provides a formulation that, when coupled with requisite top-down or bottom-up dynamic planning or resource allocation mechanisms, can help to deal with the problem of how to maintain the objectives of high-level strategic policies while changing specific tactics as needed.

KAoS ensures that the Luna agents respect all security and privacy policies, that they respond immediately to human redirection, and that they have the teamwork knowledge they need to work with analysts and other agents collaboratively. KAoS policies also ensure that the entire system adapts automatically to changes in context, environment, task reprioritization, or resources. New or modified policies can be made effective immediately.
III. THE LUNA AGENT FRAMEWORK

A. Design Objectives

In addition to the need for comprehensive policy governance to support security, end-use taskwork definition, and team coordination described earlier, the following basic objectives were also important in our approach to framework design and implementation:

- Lightweight overhead for each agent
- Efficient and reliable agent operations
- Fully-distributed operations
- Flexible agent messaging
- Full semantic representation
- Automatic two-way mapping between OWL ontologies and Java methods

B. Overview of Luna Features

In our cybersecurity applications, Luna agents function both as interactive assistants to analysts and as continuously-running background aids to data processing and knowledge discovery. Luna agents achieve much of their power through built-in team coordination capabilities that, in conjunction with IHMC’s KAoS policy services framework, allow them to be proactive, collaborative, observable, and directable. Luna also relies on KAoS for capabilities such as registration, discovery, self-description of actions and capabilities, communications transport, and messaging.

Figure 2 illustrates how KAoS integrates with Luna to provide services and to enforce policies. An OWL representation of Luna is maintained within the KAoS distributed Directory Service. Through its interactions with the Luna host environment, KAoS regulates the lifecycle of both the environment (e.g., start and stop Luna) and the agents (e.g., create, pause, resume, stop, and move agents). Policy can also regulate environment context for shared agent memory (e.g., getting and setting its properties), allowing efficient parallel processing of large data sets. An agent-based implementation of context mirroring across different Luna environments is provided. Through policy, the Luna host environment also governs agent progress appraisal—a subject to which we will return later.

Because Luna policy checking and enforcement is done by virtue of KAoS-based “method-call” messages to agents and other components, actions taken by an agent on its own (invoking its own methods) are not subject to policy. This design choice posed no problems for the use cases we envisioned.

In the future, KAoS will also integrate with VIA to provide a means of policy enforcement outside the Luna host environment. VIA [11] is a next generation cross-layer communications substrate for tactical networks and information systems. VIA allows fine-grained enforcement of policy down to operating-system-level operations such as the opening of a socket and the monitoring and filtering of specific elements of agent messaging.

In order to support dynamic scalability, load balancing, adaptive resource management, and specific application needs, the Luna platform supports the policy-governed option of allowing the state of agents (vs. code of agents) to migrate between operating environments and hosts. The Luna environment maintains agent mailboxes with message forwarding when agents migrate. Luna state mobility will provide the foundation for future implementation of agent persistence (i.e., saving and loading agent state to a persistent store).

C. Automated Mapping Between Java and OWL

Within the base class for Luna cyber agents are defined some common agent tasks that can be called through OWL descriptions. However, one of the most important innovations in Luna is the ability to add custom agent actions to the policy ontology, based on their Java equivalent. IHMC provides a Java2OWL tool to assist with this task.

To understand this feature, it is important to understand that the framework allows translation from the KAoS ‘method call’ messages to OWL action instance descriptions for policy checking, and back to method calls. The ability to convert an OWL description to a Java method call is the feature that puts ‘teeth’ in obligations. A Luna environment can invoke such methods on itself or any set of agents hosted on that Luna, or pass the obligation to one or more remote Luna environments for execution. Combine this obligation invocation feature with the fact that obligations can be triggered by one set of actors and fulfilled by another set of actors (e.g., Luna obligated to do X when Agent does Y, All Agents obligated to do X when Luna does Y), and we have a foundation for the implementation of what are called in KAoS “collective obligations” [12]. These are obligations that specify what must be done by some group of agents without saying exactly how it should be done and which specific agent(s) should do it.

The Java2OWL tool can be used to browse custom agent code, select methods to bring under policy control, and generate an OWL description for the selected method signatures. These methods are then available for policies as Actions performed by Agents of that type. The only
prerequisite is that agent code must be available (on the classpath) when Luna starts.

Our ontology for method call requests is currently low-level, representing Java Methods and their parameters including the parameter data types and the order of the parameters in the method signature.

Figure 3: Java2OWL Tool.

D. Selected Applications of Luna to Cyber Operations

Agents play a variety of roles in our cyber operations framework [12]. Among the most demanding is in multi-layer agent processing and tagging of live or retrospectively played-back NetFlow data representing worldwide Internet traffic. A high-level view of roles and relationships among agents relating to these functions is shown in figure 4.

Incoming UDP traffic goes to a NetFlow agent for parsing and transformation into Java objects (1). In principle, the same or different data could be routed to multiple NetFlow agents on the same or different hosts to share the processing load. The NetFlow agent sends the data to any number of Tagger agents that work in parallel in real-time to tag the data (2). For example, Watchlist agents tag data that appears on whitelists or blacklists while IDS Match agents tag data corresponding to intrusion detection alerts. Drawing on selected results from low-level tagging agents, Attack pattern agents may be defined to look for higher-level attack patterns. By this means, agent annotations do not merely highlight low-level indicators of threat patterns, but can directly identify the type of threat itself. For instance, instead of requiring the analyst to notice that a configuration of connecting lines (some of which may be obscured) indicates a distributed port scan, agents working on abstracted data semantics can directly indicate the source of the attack. As another example, if a message is anomalous because it is sending oversized packets to a port associated with an SQL database, higher-level agents can abstract that message and represent it as an instance of an SQL injection attack. A system of semaphores ensures that all the Tagger agents have completed their work before the NetFlow agent sends results to the Flow Cache (3). NetFlow Visualization agents enforce policies that mediate data being sent to analyst displays, ensuring, among other things, that data not authorized for viewing by particular users are automatically filtered out (4).

The Esper complex event processor [13] provides support for efficient ad hoc queries of many types that can be initiated and consumed by other visualization agents (e.g., Stripchart View agent) or by agents of other types for further processing (5). We are also considering the use of Esper for data stream handling further upstream in the agent analytic process.

CogLog Correlator agents ingest combined data from selected Tagger agents operating on real-time data (6) and historical data within the CogLog (7). The CogLog is a Semantic-Wiki-based tool prototype with which software agents and human analysts can maintain and use a log of findings pertinent to a given investigation, while also linking to other relevant information from prior cases [12]. Unlike the real-time Tagger agents, the Correlator agent can perform deeper kinds of analytics in “out of band” mode. Among other things, this correlated information can help different analysts “connect the dots” between related investigative efforts. The Correlator agents may send additional data annotations to NetFlow Visualization agents and/or to agents supporting other visualizations (e.g., Connection Graph view) (8). Our Attack Pattern Learning Agents provide another example of an “out of band” agent type. These agents consume and process all NetFlows (rather than just subsets of tagged data produced by Tagger agents) in order to learn and propagate useful threat patterns.

In the future, exploration of larger questions of adversarial intent, attack strategies, and social connections among attackers could also proceed along similar lines of increasing abstraction in agent processing. The ability to reduce perception and reasoning requirements on the analyst through fixed or ad hoc organizations of agents processing visual and logical data dimensions is a major benefit of agent-based analytics.

Figure 4: Agent processing and tagging of NetFlow data.
Initial performance data on Luna is promising, even though we have not yet focused significant attention on optimization of the framework. With respect to live processing on our test configuration (Mac Pro with two Quad-core Intel Xeon @ 2.26GHz with 16 GB RAM, 1000baseT Ethernet, Mac Pro RAID Level 0, 4x2TB), the IHMC network of ~100 nodes is the only one we have tested thus far. Performance at this small scale of less than 1000 flows/second is, of course, excellent.

With respect to retrospective performance in our current configuration, the maximum rate of our CyberLab NetFlow emulator playing back Internet 2 data is 80k flows/second (~14MB/second) and the maximum rate of Luna agent NetFlow parsing is 60k flows/second. Sample configurations that include the additional task of maintaining a cache of NetFlows in shared RAM result in rates of 52k flows/second (single Watchlist agent with 50 ips on its list), 49k flows/second (a Watchlist agent added with 700 IPs on its list), 43k flows/second (four more Watchlist agents added with 10 IPs each on their lists), and 39k flows/second (an IDS Match agent added whose performance is constrained by file I/O).

We realize that these performance numbers fall short of requirements for some large-scale cyber applications. We are confident that an effort to optimize agent processing within and between agents would yield significant performance increases. More importantly, because of the distributed nature of the Luna architecture, we are in a good position to take advantage of whatever scale of computing and network resources might be available for a given application.

**IV. LUNA POLICY EXAMPLES**

Luna is governed by policy statements that take either the form of authorization or obligation policies as follows:

- **Actor** is **[authorized | not authorized]** to perform **Action** requested by **Actor** with attributes…
- **[before | after]** **Actor** performs **Action** requested by **Actor** with attributes

When Luna policies are defined, the underlined terms above (**Actor**, **Action**) are replaced in point-and-click fashion with more-specific concepts automatically drawn from the extensible ontologies maintained within KAoS. Actors in the policy statements above could be made to refer to one or more classes or instances of the Luna host environment, e.g.:

- **Class:** *All Luna environments*
- **Extensionally defined collection of groups:** *Luna in group 'NOC_A', 'NOC_B'*
- **Intensionally defined collection of groups:** *Luna with context property 'Alert Level' in ('Critical', 'High')*
- **Extensionally defined collection of individuals:** *LunaNOC_A_1, LunaNOC_A_Shared*
- **Intensionally defined collection of individuals:** *Luna containing agent 'BotnetC2Correlator'*

A few specific examples of the sorts of Luna capabilities that allow them to become good team players.

A. **Teamwork Policy Examples**

It is one thing to enable software agents to perform the taskwork needed to help human analysts with complex high-tempo tasks and quite another to equip them with the capabilities that allow them to become good team players. Our perspective on resilient human-agent teamwork comes from joint activity theory [14], a generalization of Herbert Clark’s work in linguistics [15, p. 3]. Our theory describes the criteria for joint activity, outlines aspects of its “choreography,” and highlights the major requirements for effective coordination in situations where the activities of parties are interdependent. For the purposes of this discussion, we focus primarily on examples of the sorts of policies we are designing to support human-agent teamwork, under the headings of observability, directability, interpredictability, learning, and multiplicity:

- **Observability:** An important aspect of observability is being able to know how agents are progressing on their current tasks, especially those in which their actions are interdependent (e.g., “I’m not going to be able to get you the information you need to get started on your task by the deadline to which we agreed previously.”) To support this, we have implemented built-in mechanisms and policies for progress appraisal [16] in Luna.
- **Directability:** When agents need to be redirected due to changes in priorities, new knowledge, or failures, users can add and retract obligations on particular agents or classes of agents or Luna environments at runtime. This includes obligations relating to life-cycle control, such as pausing or resuming their operation.
- **Interpredictability:** One way in which the interpredictability of an agent can be assessed is through...
a combination of data on its current progress with its past history of work in similar contexts.

- **Learning**: The observability features of agents can be used to support capabilities for policy learning—i.e., creating new KAoS policies programmatically based on patterns that are consistent and important to tasks being undertaken by a whole class of agents. The process of learning itself may be subject to policies relating to the scope of adaptation permitted in a given context. It may also be subject to optional policy requirements for human oversight.

- **Multiplicity**: Multiplicity, the requirement for multiple perspectives on the same data, can be supported by policy-based enforcement of data consistency across these perspectives. For example, policies would ensure that changes in one view of the data would propagate correctly (and with the appropriate policy restrictions on what can be viewed) to other kinds and instances of views on that data.

Of the areas mentioned above, progress appraisal and agent (re-)directability through obligations are currently the most well-worked-out aspect of these five human-agent-teamwork-based considerations in Luna. As an illustration of how these considerations can be supported through policy, we describe our implementation of progress appraisal below.

Providing regular reports of agent progress is an integral feature of every Luna agent. The Luna environment handles all of the progress management including:

- Registration and deregistration of users and agents to receive progress reports from particular agents;
- Maintaining a timer to send agent progress reports periodically (e.g., every minute);
- Querying the agent periodically for its current progress, or providing an interface for agents to announce milestone-based progress events;
- Distributing the agent’s progress reports to the interested parties.

The decision to have the Luna environment manage progress appraisal rather than relying on the agents themselves was a deliberate one. Some of the key advantages over agent self-managed progress appraisal include:

- Luna can provide progress in conditions where the agent cannot;
- Luna may pause an agent so that it would no longer capable of sending progress messages.
- The agent may be buggy or otherwise unresponsive, but Luna will still send progress to users (indicating that the agent is unresponsive);
- Policy control over the frequency and recipients of progress appraisal enables directing or redirecting progress appraisals from groups of agents to other agents for further analysis.

**B. Network Operations Center Scenario Policy Examples**

In the development of experimental scenarios for network operations center use of our framework, we considered requirements for access control, action authorization, information sharing, and coordination between local and remote sites. Below we give some illustrative examples of KAoS policy support in Luna for these issues.

Imagine a scenario involving two cooperating network operations centers (NOC) at different locations, NOC_A and NOC_B. Each NOC has its own policies, in addition to policies that are shared between them.

NOC_A has three Luna environments:

- **Luna_NOC_A_Monitoring**: Within this environment, monitoring analysts from NOC_A create and maintain agents to support shared visualizations.
- **Luna_NOC_A_Analysis**: Within this environment, analysts from NOC_A create agents to perform ad hoc analysis and investigation tasks.
- **Luna_NOC_A_Shared**: Within this environment, analysts from either NOC_A or NOC_B can create agents to perform ad hoc analysis and investigation tasks.

NOC_B has one Luna environment:

- **Luna_NOC_B**: Within this environment, analysts from NOC_B create agents to perform monitoring, ad hoc analysis, and investigation tasks.

KAoS uses the concept of “domains” to define the scope of policies. In this case, the two NOCs will share a domain. In addition, each NOC will have its own domain, and, within NOC_A, each NOC_A Luna environment will be a subdomain to the NOC A domain. For the convenience of the administrator wanting to minimize the number of policies that need to be defined, the mode of a domain can be set to be “tyrannical” (where everything is forbidden that is not explicitly authorized) or “laissez-faire” (where everything is permitted that is not explicitly forbidden). Here are some examples of policies in the scenario, assuming a tyrannical domain.

**Authorization Policy Examples.** This positive authorization policy specifies that NOC Administrators can make any request of any Luna environment:

*Any Luna is authorized to perform any Action requested by a member of the NOC Administrators Group*

This positive authorization policy allows any user to make requests of any Luna environment belonging to the same group as that user.

*Luna in any Group is authorized to perform any Action requested by a member of the same Group*

The positive authorization policy permits remote users from NOC_B to manage agents within the shared Luna environment, while the negative authorization policy prevents these users from lifecycle actions such as stopping the environment or changing its context properties:

*LunaNOC_A_Shared is not authorized to perform any environment lifecycle action requested by a member of Group NOC_B*

**Obligation Policy Examples.** This positive obligation policy requires any newly created Watchlist agent to send progress reports to the Watchlist Correlation agent:

*After Any Luna performs create agent of type 'Watchlist Agent,' that Luna is obligated to add agent progress listener where: listener is 'Watchlist Correlation Agent'*

Given the ability of agents to ‘take actions’ on behalf of users, it is important to consider how these considerations can be supported through policy.
This positive obligation policy requires approval by NOC-A-Admin before any agents not specifically requested migrate into the NOC_A group:
Before Luna_NOC_A_Shared performs move agent where destination in group NOC_A and not requested by 'NOC-A-Admin'
That Luna is obligated to obtain approval from 'NOC-A-Admin'
Obligation Policy Examples Combining Luna Agents and Environments. The Actors in an obligation policy may be a mix of Luna environments and agents. In this way, a Luna environment can respond to specified agent actions and vice versa.

For example, this positive obligation policy requires the Luna_NOC_A_Analysis environment to send a progress update every time a Botnet agent identifies a new botnet command-and-control address:
After BotnetAgent performs FoundC2 Luna_NOC_A_Analysis is obligated to perform SendAgentProgressUpdate

This positive obligation policy requires a class of agents that keep large data caches in RAM to clear their caches before being paused:
Before Luna performs PauseAgent where Agent is of type CacheAgent That Agent is obligated to perform DumpCache

C. Policy Examples for Tuning System Performance
As described above, policy services can be used to regulate the taskwork and teamwork of Luna agents. A few examples of additional potential uses of policy for tuning system performance include the following:

- **Service orchestration.** Such policies might regulate how an agent chooses other actors to construct capabilities for high-level mission requirements.

- **Operational bounds.** A Web server that receives a request with a SQL query will search for the best database to execute that query—and may in fact induce the creation of a database for such purpose. Policies might govern when the creation of a database is permitted and when it is not.

- **QoS policies.** Such policies would define the operational ranges of different services and define the trade-off strategies between different metrics.

V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has provided an overview of some of the unique features of the Luna agent framework. In particular, we have shown how Luna is specifically designed to allow developers and users to leverage different forms of policy-based governance in an endless variety of ways. Although our illustrations have been drawn from the application of Luna to cyber operations, we believe that its features will prove useful in the future for many additional problem domains.

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